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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect PE-backing has on portfolio companies in financial
distress. Inspired by the more recent questioning of the morality of the Private Equity
industry, this paper analyzes the change in financial health after a PE buyout
transaction and directly compares that of financially distressed firms during the same
time period that were not PE-backed. This study utilizes a dataset made up of
financially distressed, public US firms as of 2009, and assesses the change in Z-score
~10 years after PE investment to determine whether PE-backing has an effect on the
change in financial health. The negative coefficient in the regression results suggest
that PE-backing has a negative effect on difference in Z-score between 2009 and the
last twelve months financials. However, these results are insignificant at the 90% and
95% confidence level and I am unable to conclude that PE backing hurts companies in
financial distress in the general population. Limitations in the availability of data that
resulted in a much larger sample of non-backed financially distressed firms than those
that are PE-backed may have contributed to the insignificance of the results for this
sample.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Introduction ........................................................................................................................1
Literature Review ..............................................................................................................4
Data .....................................................................................................................................9
3.1 Data Introduction and Filtration: ...............................................................................9
3.2 Empirical Results .....................................................................................................10
Discussion..........................................................................................................................14
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................15
References .........................................................................................................................17
Tables and Appendix .......................................................................................................19

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude for Professor Murat Binay for his continued
support and guidance that made this thesis possible. Thank you for being so
approachable and flexible during this entire process. I will never forget your corporate
finance course my sophomore year which exposed me to the finance world and sparked
my initial interest in this field. I am grateful to my friends who have made my CMC
experience the past four years amazing. Finally, I would like to thank my sister and
parents for their continuous love, support, encouragement and laughs.

1. Introduction
The Private Equity (PE) boom and the Leveraged Buyout transaction made their
first noticeable presence in the late 1980’s, however PE booms have made their mark on
many more periods since then. In 1991, new transactions totaled $7.5 billion and by the
end of 2006, the market had reached more than $500 billion (Cain 2015). PE-backing and
the LBO strategy aim to transform portfolio companies using the resources and financing
the PE managers bring. More specifically, one popular LBO strategy primarily focuses on
investing in under-performing companies they strongly believe can be restructured and
transformed into money-making vehicles. In parallel, there are many firms suffering from
financial distress that have sought out PE investors to help save their company from
bankruptcy. The growing market for the Private Equity industry and proven profitable
track record for both PE managers and portfolio companies has heavily influenced
millions of new PE shops to arise and managers to take on additional risks, proven by the
growth in total assets under PE management. However, these great successes that have
attracted many to the industry have been heavily publicized while the losses, many of
which have consequently led to the destruction of less notable PE-backed businesses,
have been swept under the rug.
Over the years, the intentions and reputation of Private Equity firms have been
increasingly called into question. Recent studies have been examining whether these
firms actually intend on helping their portfolio companies or if PE managers, like many,
are simply interested in generating profit no matter the cost. The sector is set to manage
over $5.8 trillion worth of assets by 2025 according to studies by Deloitte, and one
argument claims that in order for the market to reach this size, many portfolio companies
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will be destroyed in the process. PE firms have been accused of (1) asset stripping for the
purpose of reselling assets within short periods of time (asset flipping); (2) initiating
corporate restricting within firms that negatively impacts portfolio companies’ culture
and employees; and (3) using leverage and off-shore holdings companies to reduce tax
charges or contribute to positive investment performance (Acharya, 2007).
The most prominent example where a Private Equity investment was blamed for
leading to the destruction of a struggling portfolio company was the case of KKR, Bain,
and Vornado Realty Trust acquiring Toys R Us in July 2005. Toys R Us had been
struggling to keep up with consumer and retail trends in the industry, and KKR, Bain and
the Vornado Realty Trust invested in Toys R Us because they believed the firm’s profits
could be turned around under their financing and management. However, the reality was
after acquiring the firm for $6.6 billion, their PE backers drowned Toys R Us in over $5
billion worth of debt (Harvard Business Review, 2021). In addition, investors attempted
to cash out through an IPO strategy however ended up being forced to cancel the $800
million IPO due to “market conditions.” Subsequently, after $1.3 billion invested by the
three PE firms, the investors refused to put in anymore. Suffering from distressed
financial results in all compacities, Toys R Us finally liquidated the firm and declared
bankruptcy seven years later in September 2017 (Morgenson and Rizzo, 2018).
Many ponder whether Toys R Us would have been able to save itself without the
overarching investors and quadrupled debt that this transaction brought with it.
Furthermore, without the bad publicity of the deal’s failure, it’s possible that future
investors and the overall market may have been more interested in a Toys R Us IPO.
However, although this buyout intended on sprucing up the company strategy, cutting
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costs, and overhauling the business in 3-5 years, the investors levered the company up
with debt whose profits couldn’t upkeep holding, ultimately leading to its demise.
This paper will examine the role of a PE firm that sought out or agreed to invest
in a distressed company and the impact it had on improving the portfolio company’s
financial health. The main question I aim to answer is whether or not firms in financial
distress are better off restructuring from within, or depending on outside investors to take
control of their business through an LBO transaction. In my analysis I included additional
explanatory factors such as the size and debt levels of the firm being bought out, which
may contribute to the attractiveness from the perspective of the PE investor or the
magnitude of the firm’s change in financial health. Finally, from my sample results I
attempt to determine whether companies in financial distress have a better chance of
improving their overall financial health with or without investment by a Private Equity
firm and furthermore, whether PE investment hurts or helps firms in financial distress.
Section 2 takes a deeper dive comparing my research question to the already
established literature surrounding PE investment, probability of default and bankruptcy.
In Section 3 I outline how the dataset was compiled to create a sample of distressed
firms, including both firms PE-backed and non PE-backed. After, the empirical tests and
results are described in detail and although insignificant, a negative regression coefficient
on PE backing suggests that there may be a negative relationship between PE-backing
and change in Z-score. In Sections 4 and 5 this paper concludes by discussing the
meanings behind these results and further research that can be conducted which could
reach a more significant conclusion.
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2. Literature Review
Similar studies have been conducted investigating Private Equity firms’ ability to
help their target companies escape financial distress. The most similar study was
conducted by Hotchkiss, Smith, and Stromberg (2021) examining the role of PE firms in
the resolution of financial distress, more specifically analyzing the relationship between
PE backing, financial distress, and bankruptcy. This study took firms with rates below
Moody’s investment grade (Ba1 or below), at some point between 1997 and 2011, and
compared their probability of default to a similar sample of firms in financial distress that
were later bought out by PE firms through LBO transactions. Although their results
suggested that there was a higher probability of default among PE-backed companies,
these results were not statistically significant and other factors may have contributed to
their findings.
Furthermore, Tykova and Borell (2012) conducted a study comparing PE-backed
and non PE-backed bankruptcy rates as well as levels of financial stress for both private
and public firms in Europe. Although they found PE-backed companies suffered from
higher distress risk after buyout than non-backed companies when looking at Altman’s Zscore calculation, PE-backed companies overall did not result in higher bankruptcy rates
than comparable non-backed companies. In fact, in some cases backing from experienced
PE firms resulted in the their portfolio company’s probability of bankruptcy to be lower.
This contradicting point supports other theories arguing that PE firms may actually help
portfolio companies in the long run.
Further supporting the contradicting side claiming PE firms positively impact
portfolio companies, Cain (2015) researches the power of reputational concerns and their
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ability to incentivize PE firms to keep their portfolio companies in good standing. This
research focuses on possible consequences PE firms may face if portfolio companies are
left in worse positions than they were found. Cain explains it’s likely that if a private
equity firm were to default on a contract today, the firm runs the risk of losing the trust of
future transaction personnel or being forced into less appealing contracts in the future.
Cain then empirically finds that private equity firms are willing to bear losses on preagreed transactions for up to 9% of their fund sizes. These results indicate that in many
cases, the firm’s reputation is worth more than losing money on a transaction. These
reputational consequence incentives can also be applied when explaining why PE firms
should be motivated to help bring portfolio companies out of financial distress. Because
PE firms are repeat players who invest in many companies over a long time horizon,
investing in a financially distressed company that later declares bankruptcy can lead to
more impactful consequences than a sole monetary penalty. Poor reputations or results
can influence future target companies and possibly lead to less deal flow in the future,
therefore incentivizing managers to care about saving portfolio companies from financial
distress in addition to creating the best possible monetary outcome.
In addition, other studies have provided evidence showing that experienced PE
investors who specialize in managing financially distressed companies improve portfolio
companies in the long run significantly better than inexperienced counterparts. Huang,
Ritter, and Zhang (2016) use bond yield spreads and firms’ IPO data that’s results
suggest PE firms help their portfolio companies reduce their overall costs of debt. This
evidence also supports that PE firms do not hurt their portfolio companies, but actually
improve them. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) make a similar argument after sampling 31
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LBO transactions in the 1980’s, studying the possible benefits of PE intervention 10
years after the transaction took place. They also find that value gains outweighed the
costs of financial distress. However, neither of these samples included a control group of
comparable companies in similar positions that may have created even more value on
their own, without the intervention of PE firms.
I test against these positive theories and continue research using Altman’s Z-score
as the initial measure of financial distress to investigate financially distressed companies’
relationships with PE backing. After using Altman’s Z-score to identify firms in financial
distress, I examine the effect PE investment has on the change in Z-score. Altman’s Zscore takes into account many of the financial distress ratios discussed by Hotchkiss,
Smith, and Stromberg, combining them into one overarching score. More specifically, the
Z-score equation acts as a measure of liquid assets in relation to firms’ size, cumulative
profitability reflecting the firm’s age, cash supply available to creditors, and market
capitalization which takes into account the stock market’s price change which may
foreshadow pending problems. Altman believes that this ratio is a more effective
financial distress prediction than simplified book values such as operating profit or
financial leverage. In addition, using this change in score to assess the change in each
firm’s financial health will encompass the main argument I am testing, which is whether
PE-backing helps or hurts financially distressed portfolio companies overall.
Furthermore, my study consists of a more recent sample of financially distressed
companies from the tail end of 2009, after the peak of the Private Equity boom, attracted
by the availability of credit and the rising stock market (Cain, 2007), and following the
Great Financial Crisis. I will analyze the statistical significance of the difference in Z-
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score for those bought out by PE firms and those operating on their own ~10 years later,
using the 2009 and most recent LTM financials. The model will be constructed with a
PE-backed dummy variable, and also account for additional explanatory variables that
could affect my sample.
My hypothesis predicts I find a negative relationship between PE-backing and
change in Z-score. If proven true and statistically significant, these results would support
those arguing that PE firms primarily focus on making individual financial profits and PE
investment hurts target companies in financial distress rather than helps them. In addition,
these findings would add to existing critiques of Private Markets and the finance industry
as a whole which holds numerous opinions believing that the industry is full of selfish
managers that prioritize money and profit more than saving the portfolio companies they
invest in. My hypothesis lies in line with the research conducted by Hotchkiss, Smith and
Stromberg and financial distress measures of Tykova and Borell, however it directly
contrasts some of the previous research by others stating that PE-backing leads to
improved bankruptcy rates and overall improvement of portfolio companies. In addition,
if true these findings would argue against the previously studied reputational theory. My
sample is most closely aligned with the previous studies conducted by Hotchkiss, Smith,
and Stromberg (2021) and Tykova and Borell (2012), however my sample consists of
companies already in financial distress according to their Altman’s Z-score instead of
according to Moody’s rating; I also assess the improvement or destruction of the firms’
financial health rather than testing for bankruptcy and default probability. My findings
present discrepancies in PE-actions and incentives, using a sample from a more recent
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time period and focusing on public companies not solely based in any geographic
location.
The negative coefficients on the PE backing dummy variable from my regression
results suggest that PE-backing has a negative effect on the improvement in the financial
health of the portfolio company. However, the insignificance of these results lead to an
inconclusive effect of PE backing on financially distressed firms. These results are in line
and add to the already established literature by Hotchkiss, Smith and Stromberg and
Tykova and Borell by further questioning the positive effect of PE investment on firms in
financial distress. Furthermore, these findings add to the research by assessing a different
private equity boom time period and a unique measure of financial health improvement.
Although it is impossible to assess how these firms would have performed without PEbacking, the direction of results from this paper as well as the previous literature lead to
suspect that these PE-backed, financially distressed firms might have been better off on
their own.
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3. Data
3.1 Data Introduction and Filtration
I primarily use CapitalIQ to identify the sample of financially distressed
companies that I test. The first and most important identifier is the extraction of Public,
US companies in financial distress as of CY 2009. For all companies, I assess the
improvement of financial health by calculating the change in Z-score between 2009 and
LTM financials. I identify PE-backed companies from my sample that recorded deal
transactions between 01-01-2010 and 12-31-2012 using information and data provided by
PitchBook. Therefore, the variable I include to help answer my thesis question, does PEbacking help or hurt firms in financial distress, is a PE-backed dummy variable, worth 1
for previously PE-backed firms and 0 for non-backed, that is regressed against the change
in Z-score.
My dataset consists of all distressed public companies trading on US exchanges
with Z-scores below 1.81 as of CY 2009. According to Altman’s Z-score, a firm with a
score below 1.81 means the company is in extreme financial distress and has a high
probability of going bankrupt within the next two years. If this threshold was greater or
closer to 2.0 or 2.5, it would increase my sample size. However. I used 1.81 as the
threshold for public, US companies in order to create a sample made up of firms in very
similar distressed positions and to analyze the most extreme cases where improvement
may result with the support of PE-backing. In addition, because of the prior research
finding cases showing that PE firms will do anything to turn a profit, this low threshold
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produced a sample that if a lesser increase in Z-score is proved for PE-backed companies,
this would imply PE companies hurt firms defined by Altman as the most distressed.
Next, to clean the downloaded data from CapitalIQ I filtered out any companies
that were first listed on Pink Sheets LLC (OTCPK) as well as any companies that did not
have a primary exchange listed. If I were to have included companies listed on the Pink
Sheets, this would have negatively affected my sample given that firms listed on this
exchange do not really function as public companies and are placed on this exchange
right before liquidating or declaring bankruptcy. Finally, I filtered for companies that
only formally listed US public exchanges as their first exchange rather than secondary.
After applying these filters, I entered the remaining 768 firms into Pitchbook with
the dates mentioned above, to identify which firms were formerly PE-backed. In total,
there were 82 companies that were bought out by PE investors between 2010 and 2012
across 69 different investors. Generally, research has shown that PE deals should see
results between 3-5 years, however I will be testing for financial health improvement
according to LTM financials, ~10 years after the transaction took place. I chose this
larger gap after investment to account for the 3-year transaction date range and to allow
for a higher probability improvement results have surfaced. In addition, I entered the 768
firms into the WRDS database to retrieve relevant supplemental firm specific
information.
3.2 Empirical Results
A. Summary Statistics
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Table 1 contains the full sample of financially distressed firms and the proportion
of PE-backed and non PE-backed (768 total firms, 89.3% non PE-backed and 10.7% PEbacked). Table 2 contains the summary statistics for change in Z-score for the entire
sample, as well as selected summary statistics after separating the PE-backed and non
PE-backed firms. After initially looking at these results, the most significant difference is
the difference in the means between the PE-backed and non PE-backed companies. The
higher mean and median for the non PE-backed companies suggest that on average, non
PE-backed companies in financial distress improve the financial health of their business
more than PE-backed financially distressed companies.
However, the standard error for PE-backed companies is almost half of the mean,
and kurtosis is incredibly high suggesting that there is extreme variance in the difference
in Z-score within my sample. Similarly, the standard error for non-PE backed companies
is also almost a third of the mean meaning that there is extreme variance in the difference
in Z-scores among non PE-backed firms as well. The extreme outliers in my sample may
be heavily affecting the third moments of measurement as well as the mean and standard
error in my sample, especially in the non PE-backed group.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that very few of these financially distressed
companies were actually saved completely. According to Altman’s Z-score a company is
considered financially healthy if their score is above 3.0. Furthermore, a score of 3.0
signifies that the firm is in the safe zone and is unlikely to file for bankruptcy. The results
in Table 3 show that of all the 768 companies, only 180 are now out of financial distress
(12 PE-backed, 168 non-backed). Although on average the Altman’s Z-score did improve
overall for both PE-backed firms and non PE-backed firms, these results indicate that
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regardless of PE-backing, it is incredibly difficult for firms to completely escape financial
distress and end up in the financially healthy realm even over 10 years later.
B. Regression Analysis PE-backing on Difference in Z-Score
I assess whether PE involvement has a negative effect on change in Z-score by
regressing a PE-backed dummy variable against difference in Z-score. At first glance,
Table 4 shows regression results suggesting that PE-backing has a negative effect on
difference in Z-score where β1 has a coefficient of -10.78. In addition, the R2 measure of
.4484 and R of .6696 indicate that the correlation between PE-backing and difference in
Z-score is around 67%. Furthermore, 44.84% of the variance in difference in Z-score can
be explained by PE-backing. However, when taking a closer look, the T-statistic of -0.76
indicates that these results are not statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
C. Regression Analysis PE-backing on Difference in Z-Score with Added Control
Variables
In order to control for varying firm and financial characteristics, I also included a
regression with various financial ratios that affect some or all parts of the Z-score
calculation in Table 5. I retrieved these numbers from WRDS, and the fewer number of
observations in the regression analysis (408 compared to 768 in the original regression) is
due to the limited data that WRDS provided. The additional explanatory variables were
included to control for varying firm-specific characteristics, in order to get a better
understanding of whether PE-backing has a negative effect on difference in Z-score.
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Once again, there is a negative coefficient of -4.87 on the PE-backed dummy
variable. Although the absolute value of the coefficient is lower, indicating a smaller
effect of PE-backing on difference in Z-score, the standard error has also decreased
meaning that these control variables helped determine a more true effect of PE-backing.
This is also indicated by the increase in absolute value of the T-statistic from 0.76 to
1.29.
Although the absolute value of the T-statistic is closer to 1.96, which would make
the results significant at the 95% confidence level, I again cannot reject the null
hypothesis that PE-backing has no effect on difference in Z-score.
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4. Discussion
My thesis question examines whether PE companies hurt or help portfolio
companies in distress. In other words, I am investigating whether financially distressed
firms that seek out help or are sought out by PE investors, or a combination of both,
would be better off improving the financial health of their firm without an official deal
transaction. Through regression analysis with many control variables, I have discovered
that PE-backing has a negative coefficient on the difference in Z-score in my sample. In
addition, although not extremely high, the correlation of almost 44% indicates that there
is somewhat of a relationship between PE-backing and difference in Z-score. However,
the insignificance of these results do not allow me to conclude that the general population
of financially distressed firms are hurt from PE investment; these results only further add
to questioning whether financially distressed firms would be better off on their own.
My results are in line with results that were found by Hotchkiss, Smith, and
Stromberg (2021) finding that non PE-backed financially distressed firms are generally
better off than those that are PE-backed, but like their test, my results are not statistically
significant. The results found in my sample are also in line with those found by Tykova
and Borell (2012) where financial stress was higher for PE-backed companies when
looking at Altman’s Z-score calculations. On the other hand, my results do not
significantly disprove positive theories stating that PE investment helps firms improve
their business and overall profitability.
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5. Conclusion
Motivated by the recent theories questioning the underlying morality of the
Private Equity industry and individual investment priorities, this paper takes a unique
approach in examining whether PE investment has a negative effect on financially
distressed firms based solely on overall financial health change. This study specifically
focuses on financially distressed firms rather than healthy firms in order to further
question whether PE investors are willing to fully dismantle portfolio companies in order
to turn a profit on the investment. Although the results from the regression analysis I
conducted are inconclusive due to the insignificance of the effect of the primary PEbacking variable on difference in Z-score, they do not support that financially distressed
firms are better off with PE-backing.
My sample could have been improved and led to statistically significant results if
there was a more even ratio of PE-backed to non PE-backed companies, and specifically
more PE-backed data points to analyze. In both groups it’s probable outlier data points
skewed my overall results and more data points could have led my results to be less
affected by these outliers. Furthermore, it is also likely that additional or unlimited access
to data on the sponsors and their targets would complete this investigation and find more
significant results of the negative effect of PE-backing on financial health improvement.
Because the use of control variables led to a reduction in the standard error and an
increase in significance, the testing of other control variable combinations may have also
help lead to a concrete conclusion.
My sample was also filtered based on Z-scores as of CY 2009, only one year after
the Great Financial Crisis. The heightened number of firms across all industries that were
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effected opened opportunity for distress PE investors, however made it more difficult to
decipher which firms were structurally suffering and which were just still reflecting
backlash from the financial crisis. Therefore, studies on additional time periods could
have also led to more significant results.
More research in this area can also be conducted using a different dependent
variable other than Altman’s Z-score to measure improvement. Similarly, datasets can be
filtered uniquely to find results that would also help answer my research question.
Varying Z-score boundaries or a different measure of financial distress when choosing
the initial sample would create a sample that would also analyze overall PE effect on
distressed firms. In addition, I solely looked at formerly PE-backed firms that are no
longer financed by Private Equity investors. Future research could investigate various
other types of private transactions, including current versus non-current backing of any
capacity to assess the effect of Private investment. Finally, in order to be safe, I analyzed
the difference in Z-score ~10 years after the transaction took place. Because prior
research states that it only takes 3-5 years for effects of PE investment to result in
portfolio companies, it may also be beneficial to analyze dependent variables defining
financial health improvement either more recent to the transaction date or even longer
after the transaction takes place.
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7. Tables and Appendix
Table 1: Sample Proportions – PE-backed vs. Non PE-backed
This table shows the proportion of PE-backed to Non-PE backed financially distressed
firms in my dataset. There is a much greater number of Non-PE backed firms – this is not
surprising given the fact that PE transactions are not extremely common and that PE
transactions for financially distressed firms are even less common. The firms are taken
from CapitalIQ and the PE-backing information is provided by Pitchbook.

PE-backed firm
Non PE-backed Firms
Total

Number of firms
82
686
768

% of full sample
10.7%
89.3%
100.0%

Table 2: Summary Statistics for PE-backed, Non PE-backed, and Total Sample
Change in Z-Score
This table includes selected summary statistics for change in Z-score from 2009 to the
LTM of PE-backed, Non-PE-backed, and combined financially distressed firms. These
summary statistics are calculated from CapitalIQ and PE-backing information is taken
from Pitchbook. What is most interesting to note is that the mean and median change in
Z-score is much higher for Non PE-backed financially distressed firms than those that
are PE-backed. However, the positive mean shows that PE-backing does not necessarily
hurt portfolio firms in financial distress. In addition, the third moments, kurtosis and
skewness, are very large meaning that there are many outliers that could have affected
these results.

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Kurtosis
Skewness
Count

PE-backed
2.42
1.15
0.88
10.38
49.30
6.50
82

Non PE-backed
13.20
4.91
0.96
128.53
530.92
22.16
686

Total
12.05
4.39
0.96
121.56
593.35
23.42
768
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Table 3: Firms That Improved Their Z-Score to Above 3.0
This table shows the number of firms that have increased their Z-score from below 1.81
in 2009 to above 3.0 from their LTM financials. This data was taken from CapitalIQ
results. These results prove that it is incredibly difficult for firms below 1.81 in Z-score to
improve their Z-score to a financially healthy score of 3.0 regardless of PE investment.
This is shown by only 23.4% of all firms were able to achieve this, almost all of them
being Non PE-backed firms.

PE-backed firm
Non PE-backed Firms
Total

Number of firms
12
168
180

% of full sample
1.6%
21.9%
23.4%

Table 4: PE-backed Against Difference in Z-Score Regression Results
This table shows the regression results running the PE-backing dummy variable against
change in Z-score. Although the T-statistic of -0.76 indicates insignificance, the negative
coefficient on PE-backing means that PE-backing has a negative effect on change in Zscore and therefore supporting the direction of my hypothesis. In addition, the 44% R2
value indicates that the model is not perfect, however almost half of the variability in
change in Z-score can be explained in PE-backing. All data is taken from CapitalIQ.

Difference in Z Score
PE-backed
Constant

Coefficient
-10.78
13.20

Std. Error
14.207
4.642

T
-0.76
2.84

Number of obs =
768
F (8, 399)
= 0.58
R-squared
= 0.4484
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Table 5: PE-backed and Control Variables Against Difference in Z-Score
Regression Results
This table shows the multiple variable regression on difference in Z-score. The following
explanatory variables were chosen to control for the discrepancies between the sample
firms such a size and other varying financial characteristics. In addition, many of the
control variables in this regression contribute to the Z-score calculation. The regression
results show a more significant negative effect on PE-backing on change in Z-score,
again supporting my hypothesis.
Difference in Z Score
PE-backed
Market/Book
Market Cap
Debt/Market Cap
Interest Exp/Total Debt - 10YR
Gross Profit Margin
Debt/Equity
Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Constant

Coefficient
-4.87
-0.00014
-1.33E-05
0.0000835
0.0428
0.0009506
0.0008012
0.0056271
5.72

Std. Error
3.77
0.00054
3.79E-05
0.000351
0.0299
0.0033
0.0047
0.0402
1.28

T
-1.29
-0.26000
-3.50E-01
0.24
1.43
0.29
0.17
0.14
4.48

Number of obs =
408
F (8, 399)
= 0.52
R-squared
= 0.0104

21

Table 6: PE-Backed Firms – Summary of Financial Characteristics
This table consists of firm-specific ratios and financial characteristics to paint a general
picture of the financially PE-backed, public US distressed companies with Z-scores
below 1.81 as of 2009. Some of the most defining characteristics that exemplify these PEbacked firms started out in financial distress are the extremely high mean leverage ratios.
In addition, given these firms are struggling both with high debt levels and with
profitability, it is not surprising that the mean gross profit margin is below -100%. The
varying n values that are not all equal to the full sample size of 82 PE-backed firms is
due to the limited data collection that was provided by WRDS.

Total Assets
Revenue
EBIT
Pre-Tax Income
Total Debt
Gross Profit Margin
Total Debt/Equity
Market Cap
Total Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Interest Exp/Total Debt - 10 years Treasury Yield
Debt/Market Cap

N
59
58
58
59
57
58
58
60
59
53
52

Mean
4287.98
2127.23
172.61
-0.70
2395.64
-104.14
94.43
603.06
25.10
5.91
1889.82

Median
1286.18
297.79
61.71
-0.13
670.37
0.32
1.10
189.85
0.17
0.00
1.38
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Table 7: Non PE-backed Firms – Summary of Financial Characteristics
This table consists of firm-specific ratios and financial characteristics to paint a general
picture of the financially non PE-backed, public US distressed companies with Z-scores
below 1.81 as of 2009. High leverage means and medians and debt levels are some of the
most defining characteristics that exemplify these non PE-backed firms are in financial
distress. In addition, given these firms are struggling both with high debt levels and with
profitability, it is not surprising that the mean gross profit margin is below -30%. The
varying n values that are not all equal to the full sample size of 686 are due to the limited
data collection that was provided by WRDS.

Total Assets
Revenue
EBIT
Pre-Tax Income
Total Debt
Gross Profit Margin
Total Debt/Equity
Market Cap
Total Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Interest Exp/Total Debt - 10 years Treasury Yield
Debt/Market Cap

N
515
516
513
515
509
514
517
605
515
428
535

Mean
7375.34
3103.18
252.63
296.58
2567.53
-33.13
45.38
2590.80
4.71
7.27
1100.28

Median
355.00
213.19
0.49
-5.65
79.62
0.38
0.24
187.30
0.14
0.04
0.14
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Table 8: Total Sample – Summary of Financial Characteristics
Firm-specific ratios and financial characteristics to paint a general picture of the
financially public US distressed companies with Z-scores below 1.81 as of 2009. Some of
the most defining characteristics that exemplify these firms are in financial distress are
the extremely high mean leverage ratios for these firms, regardless of PE-backing. In
addition, given these firms are struggling both with high debt levels and with
profitability, it is not surprising that the mean gross profit margin is below -40%. The
varying n values that are not all equal to the full sample size of 768 are due to the limited
data collection that was provided by WRDS.

Total Assets
Revenue
EBIT
Pre-Tax Income
Total Debt
Gross Profit Margin
Total Debt/Equity
Market Cap
Total Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Interest Exp/Total Debt - 10 years Treasury Yield
Debt/Market Cap

N
574
574
571
574
566
572
575
665
574
481
587

Mean
7058.00
3004.57
244.50
266.03
2550.22
-40.33
50.33
2411.46
6.81
7.13
7.12

Median
446.59
216.89
2.95
-5.04
120.78
0.37
0.26
187.30
0.14
0.05
0.04
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Table 9: Complete Summary Statistics for PE-backed, Non PE-backed, and Total
Sample Change in Z-Score
The following table includes full summary statistics for the PE-backed, Non PE-backed,
and total sample change in Z-score. All data is calculated using data from CapitalIQ.

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

PE-backed
2.42
1.15
0.88
#N/A
10.38
107.84
49.30
6.50
93.91
-9.58
84.33
198.72
82

Non PE-backed
13.20
4.91
0.96
0.34
128.53
16519.75
530.92
22.16
3201.33
-41.43
3159.90
9055.39
686

Total
12.05
4.39
0.96
0.34
121.56
14776.10
593.35
23.42
3201.33
-41.43
3159.90
9254.11
768
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